In a profound transformation of Iran’s Islamic Republic, real power is rapidly moving away from the clerical establishment and the office of the Supreme Leader toward the commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Two months into a high-stakes war that began with U.S. and Israeli strikes in late February 2026—strikes that killed longtime Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and severely injured his son—the traditional model of absolute clerical authority has been upended. Mojtaba Khamenei now formally holds the title of Supreme Leader, but according to multiple Iranian officials, analysts, and sources close to decision-making circles, he functions largely as a legitimizing figurehead rather than an authoritative decision-maker. The IRGC and the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) now dominate both military strategy and key political choices.
This shift, first highlighted in a detailed Reuters analysis republished by Romanian outlet Digi24 on April 29, 2026, marks a historic break from the system established after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. For nearly five decades, the Supreme Leader—first Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, then Ali Khamenei—embodied the principle of velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the Islamic jurist), wielding final say over foreign policy, the military, the judiciary, and even the elected branches of government. That era appears to be ending, replaced by what experts describe as a “wartime leadership” anchored in hardline security institutions.
The Trigger: War, Assassination, and a Wounded Successor
The change was forced by events on the very first day of the conflict. U.S. and Israeli strikes in late February 2026 killed Ali Khamenei and several relatives. Mojtaba Khamenei, long rumored to be his father’s preferred successor and a hardliner with deep ties to the IRGC and intelligence services, was elevated to Supreme Leader. However, he was badly wounded in the same attacks—reports describe him as disfigured with serious leg injuries—and has not appeared publicly since. He communicates only through IRGC intermediaries or limited audio channels, operating under strict security constraints.
Insiders told Reuters that Mojtaba’s role is now mostly ceremonial: he approves decisions forged through consensus in the SNSC and among IRGC commanders rather than issuing directives himself. “Major agreements probably go through him,” noted Iranian analyst Arash Azizi, “but I don’t see him contradicting the National Security Council. How could he oppose those leading the war effort?”
IRGC’s Long Rise, Now Accelerated
The IRGC was created in 1979 specifically to safeguard the revolution against both external threats and internal counter-revolutionaries. Unlike the regular Iranian army (Artesh), the Guards were always ideological—loyal first to the Supreme Leader and the revolutionary ethos. Over decades, especially under Ali Khamenei, the IRGC expanded dramatically: it developed its own army, navy, air force, missile program, and the Quds Force for overseas operations. It also built a vast economic empire controlling oil, construction, telecommunications, and smuggling networks, giving it enormous patronage power.
The Guards have long influenced politics, backing conservative candidates and suppressing protests (most notoriously in 2009 and during the 2022–2023 “Woman, Life, Freedom” uprising). Even before the 2026 war, analysts noted a gradual “militarization” of the regime. What the current conflict has done is complete the transition: with the senior Khamenei gone and his son sidelined by injury, no single clerical figure possesses the stature or independence to check the IRGC. “We’ve moved from divine power to hard power,” observed former U.S. negotiator Aaron David Miller. “From the influence of the clergy to the influence of the Revolutionary Guard Corps. That’s how Iran is being governed.”
Key IRGC figures now steer policy. Ahmad Vahidi, a former commander with deep experience in the Quds Force, has emerged as a central interlocutor in cease-fire and negotiation talks. Parliament Speaker Mohammed Baqer Qalibaf—a former IRGC commander, ex-mayor of Tehran, and presidential contender—has acted as a bridge between political, security, and clerical elites. President Masoud Pezeshkian, elected in 2024 as a relative moderate, appears increasingly marginalized; reports indicate the IRGC has blocked some of his appointments and erected a “security cordon” around Mojtaba Khamenei, limiting civilian government access.
Wartime Decision-Making and Nuclear/Regional Stance
Power is now concentrated in a narrow, hardline circle within the SNSC, the Supreme Leader’s office, and the IRGC. This structure has kept Iran cohesive despite intense military and economic pressure—no visible fractures or major street protests have emerged nearly nine weeks into the conflict. Diplomacy reflects the new reality: Iran’s responses to U.S. proposals (mediated at times by Pakistan) are slow and cautious. Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi leads formal talks, but the IRGC’s hardline positions set the red lines. A new Iranian proposal submitted this week suggests phased negotiations that would defer the nuclear issue until after the war and focus first on Persian Gulf maritime disputes. Washington insists the nuclear file must come first.
Experts say the IRGC’s worldview—prioritizing security, deterrence, regional influence through proxies, and resistance to Western pressure—now shapes strategy. The result is a narrower policy menu: between hardline and even harder line. Pragmatists have been sidelined. The Guards’ dominance also signals stricter internal repression and a more aggressive foreign posture once the immediate conflict ends.
Historical Context and Long-Term Implications
This is not entirely sudden. Mojtaba Khamenei, born in 1969, has long been a behind-the-scenes powerbroker. He reportedly played roles in the 2009 election crackdown and cultivated ties with the IRGC and Basij militia. His father reportedly resisted hereditary succession, yet the Guards—viewing Mojtaba as a reliable defender of their interests—pushed his elevation. Recent appointments of veteran Iran-Iraq War-era IRGC figures (such as Mohsen Reza’i and Mohammad Baqr Zolqadr) to senior advisory and SNSC roles further illustrate the institutional tilt.
For the Islamic Republic, the shift could prove durable beyond the current war. The IRGC now controls not just the guns but the narrative and the levers of patronage. Clerical institutions remain important for legitimacy, but the balance has tilted decisively toward “hard power.” As Iran considers resuming talks with the Trump administration amid economic strain and the threat of renewed strikes, the absence of a single, all-powerful clerical arbiter may actually make Tehran more unified—and more intransigent—in its negotiating stance.
Whether this new model survives a return to peacetime remains to be seen. But for now, the Islamic Republic that emerged in 1979 has been reshaped by the very conflict intended to break it: from a theocracy led by a supreme cleric to a security-dominated state in which the Revolutionary Guards call the shots. The era of divine power has given way to the era of the generals.
